2025
2025
2025-10-14
The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan adopted a declaration at the first European Union–Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on April 4, 2025, pledging to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and reaffirming their “strong commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).” These resolutions reject the creation of a Turkish independent state on the island of Cyprus, recognize only the Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate authority, call on the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw their unilateral declaration of independence, and urge UN member states to refrain from recognizing the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
A few days later, on April 11, during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, the de facto leader of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, expressed deep gratitude to Azerbaijan for its consistent support. Tatar also emphasized that “Azerbaijan has always stood by Northern Cyprus.” Reiterating the phrase “one nation, three states,” Tatar highlighted Ilham Aliyev’s strong ties with Turkey and Northern Cyprus, stressing the potential for bilateral cooperation, particularly in the fields of education and tourism. He also proposed expanding collaboration in academic and cultural spheres by establishing a student exchange program between universities in Azerbaijan and Northern Cyprus.
The statements of the TRNC president following the adoption of the Samarkand Declaration can be viewed as a reliance on Azerbaijani support, given his references to Ilham Aliyev’s April 9 remarks expressing full support for the TRNC and its aspirations for international recognition. At the same forum, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister reaffirmed Baku’s “steadfast support for the TRNC,” while Aliyev, in turn, recalled that with his backing, the TRNC had obtained observer status in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).
Azerbaijan’s support for the TRNC was also emphasized on April 9 at the international forum “Facing a New World Order” held at ADA University in Baku, where Ilham Aliyev expressed his readiness to fully support the international recognition of the TRNC. He highlighted the participation of Ersin Tatar in the informal summit held in Shushi at his invitation, as well as the fact that the flag of Northern Cyprus was raised there.
These and other similar statements from Baku draw additional attention to Azerbaijan’s position and potential behavior regarding the issue of Northern Cyprus’s independence amid the region’s new geopolitical realities.
Although Baku had established strong ties and was involved in various ways in Northern Cyprus-related issues during 2004–2005 and the following years, it nonetheless argued that recognizing Northern Cyprus’s independence could provoke a reaction from Greece and other European states, which might respond by recognizing the independence of Artsakh. However, at present, the Turkish and Northern Cypriot sides indicate that this concern is no longer relevant and now expect Baku to take concrete legal steps toward recognition.
Baku, however, has not yet rushed to move from rhetorical, economic (investment), and humanitarian platforms—such as awarding an honorary doctorate to the de facto leader of the TRNC—toward the stage of legal recognition, seeking to avoid a deterioration of its relations with Greece and the European Union.
Baku’s recent political activity concerning the TRNC—such as interparliamentary contacts, frequent reciprocal visits (including to Stepanakert and Shushi), support in international forums, and various bilateral and multilateral meetings—mainly reflects Azerbaijan’s effort to balance its relations between Israel and Turkey.
Azerbaijan’s current stance appears largely conditioned by geopolitical bargaining with Turkey. Recognizing the TRNC would contradict the Western approach to resolving the Cyprus issue as well as relevant UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, Baku must take into account the 2021 Shushi Declaration with Turkey, which effectively provides Azerbaijan with a security assurance. This behavior is often compared to 1992, when, under Heydar Aliyev, the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic recognized the TRNC’s independence to gain Turkey’s support in Azerbaijan’s domestic political arena.
However, today Baku does not intend to take further steps, as doing so would, on the one hand, raise expectations for the recognition of the TRNC’s independence, and on the other hand, any abrupt actions could directly draw it into the Turkish–Israeli “Cyprus” conflict.
For Israel, Northern Cyprus is a sensitive point that could threaten or constrain the implementation of its military-political and economic strategic plans in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions. Not coincidentally, representatives of the Jewish state have even proposed the use of military force to “liberate” Cyprus (the so-called “Wrath of Poseidon”).
On the other hand, recent months have seen a growing Israeli economic presence in Northern Cyprus, particularly in the real estate sector. These information coincide with investment projects announced by Azerbaijan. Given the close ties between Baku and Tel Aviv, some experts do not rule out the possibility that Israeli investors are entering Northern Cyprus under the guise of Azerbaijani investments. This may help explain Israel’s apparent tolerance toward Baku’s close relationship with the TRNC.
Instead, Turkey voices concerns regarding the growing Israeli presence in the TRNC. On the one hand, Turkey tolerates the increasing Israeli presence in Northern Cyprus, while on the other hand, it expresses concern yet without taking any preventive measures. It is precisely here that the Azerbaijani factor may be hidden, as in this case Azerbaijani involvement helps Jewish property owners bypass Turkey’s “anti-Israeli barrier.”
In cooperation with Greece, Israel is working on scenarios for the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, accusing Turkey of occupying both Northern Cyprus and Syria. Azerbaijan, however, has so far managed to avoid becoming entangled in this complex situation—continuing to “sell” its support for the TRNC to Turkey, while at the same time stressing to Israel its position of non-recognition of the TRNC.
Moreover, in its relations with Turkey, Baku keeps the issue of Northern Cyprus active in order to stay engaged and relevant in Turkey’s internal political dynamics. Considering that all Turkish political forces hold almost identical positions regarding the TRNC, and that Erdogan’s rule in Turkey is not eternal, Ilham Aliyev seeks to maintain a set of tools that would allow him to exert influence over Ankara even after Erdogan. This is despite the fact that as early as 2005, Turkey’s current president had expressed confidence that Baku would recognize Northern Cyprus’s independence. The issue of Artsakh, however, has served as Baku’s counter card in its relations with Ankara.
Azerbaijan’s high-level official contacts with Northern Cyprus, which saw a certain revival in the mid-2000s, gained new momentum in 2020, following the war in Artsakh. Through this move, Baku seeks to “repay” Ankara by supporting Turkey’s political agenda on the Cyprus issue.
At the same time, a note of caution can be observed in Azerbaijan’s official and expert discourse. Baku remains concerned that the issue of Artsakh is still open for the European Union and, more broadly, for the West. Moreover, Baku continues to use this concern to justify its cautious approach before Turkey, also pointing to the lingering uncertainty surrounding the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process.
The recognition of Northern Cyprus’s independence could be used against Azerbaijan as an act encouraging separatist precedents and reflecting double standards, given Baku’s official position on the territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova.
Although Azerbaijan seeks to present itself as Turkey’s and Northern Cyprus’s “most loyal” partner, it in fact acts cautiously, avoiding moves that could strain its relations with the EU. Azerbaijan also closely monitors societal and political developments in Northern Cyprus. Through this approach, Baku aims to maintain the ability to play a “multi-track” political game with Turkey’s central authorities in any potential difficult situation, collaborating with different power centers while advancing its own interests.
Baku continues to play its multi-track game, extracting benefits from Turkey–TRNC cooperation, the Greece–Israel–Cyprus axis, as well as Turkey–Israel tensions. Meanwhile, residents of Northern Cyprus continue to express gratitude to Ilham Aliyev, anticipating more significant steps in future developments, and Erdogan reminds Aliyev’s promises, highlighting his support on the Artsakh issue.
Accordingly, Azerbaijan is unlikely to rush into officially and de jure recognizing Northern Cyprus’s independence, even for the sake of “brotherly” Turkey and the TRNC. Drawing on the example of the past 20 years, Baku will continue to mislead the stakeholders on this issue, extracting every possible benefit while exposing Azerbaijani duplicity and “ingratitude” toward Turkey, which supported it to occupy Artsakh.