“GEGHARD”
SCIENTIFIC ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATION
2025
2025
2025-08-13
The Azerbaijan–Israel alliance, driven by the mutual and individual interests of the two countries, poses a realistic threat to reshaping the “map” of the Middle East and the South Caucasus, and is dangerous not only for the entire region but also for individual states, including Armenia, Iran, and Turkey.
Having strategic goals, Israel was among the first to officially recognize Azerbaijan’s independence on December 25, 1991. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1992, and in 1993 Israel opened its embassy in Azerbaijan.
Official dialogue between Israel and Azerbaijan started in 1995. The parties — Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev — met in New York without mediators and noted that Israel needed a stable and reliable source of energy, while Azerbaijan needed Israeli military defense systems. The next high-level meeting took place in 1998, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid an official visit to Baku, after which Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Azerbaijan was one of its key partners.
With strategic interests in mind, Israel was the initiator of the close relationship with Azerbaijan. In this regard, significant importance was attached to the “Periphery Doctrine” of Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, which envisioned developing relations with Muslim but non-Arab states and establishing strategic ties with the neighbors of adversary countries. In this case, Azerbaijan’s geographic location with a Shi’a population, its direct border with Iran — Israel’s key regional opponent — and its oil resources were all valued.
From the mid-2000s, the Israeli leadership gave new impetus to the development of relations with Azerbaijan. A catalyst for this was the success of the Israel Our Home party in the 2006 Knesset elections and the appointment of its leader, Soviet Moldova-born Avigdor Lieberman, as deputy prime minister and minister of strategic planning. In the same elections, Yosef Shagal, born in Baku, was elected to the Knesset, becoming a spokesperson and defender of Azerbaijan’s interests there.
In 2006, a parliamentary friendship group between Israel and Azerbaijan was established headed by Shagal. He headed the “Azerbaijan–Israel Association,” which organized a number of Azerbaijani events in Tel Aviv. As a result of his activities, Israeli officials’ visits to Azerbaijan became more frequent, where they discussed the supply of Azerbaijani oil and gas to Israel. These visits resulted in Israel starting to import Azerbaijani oil via Ceyhan and the port of Haifa. In August 2007, Lieberman discussed in Baku various issues, including the Azerbaijani government providing pensions to Israeli Azerbaijanis, economic cooperation, military security, the Iranian nuclear threat, and the fight against terrorism. The Israeli deputy prime minister also attended the opening ceremony of the Baku Jewish Cultural Center.
Notably, a number of Israeli–Azerbaijani economic and military deals are linked to the Lieberman family. One cannot exclude that family business interests between the Liebermans and the Aliyevs are central in Israel’s strategic relations with Azerbaijan, considering Lieberman’s consistent praise of Ilham Aliyev, his blind eye on electoral violations in Aliyev’s favor, and so on. According to another information, Israeli intelligence services have been involved in protecting Ilham Aliyev and his family.
It was with Lieberman’s assistance that Baku began acquiring advanced Israeli military technology, including drones, which were used against Artsakh in 2016, 2020, and 2023. Thanks to Lieberman’s various ministerial positions, Israel’s attention toward Azerbaijan increased significantly — both as a venue for oil and arms trade and as an intelligence platform against Iran. Despite denials about having anti-Iranian bases in Azerbaijan, Lieberman acknowledged that Tehran would oppose the warm relations and frequent visits of Israeli officials to Baku, calling on Azerbaijan to ignore such opposition or not allow others to decide “with whom to be friends.”
It also became known that Lieberman’s sons were involved in deals to supply the Azerbaijani government with high-tech Israeli products, tax collection systems, desalination plants, and other goods. The project to build a plant to desalinate water from the Caspian Sea for drinking purposes — a pressing issue for Baku — was also linked to Lieberman’s family-owned company, I.D.E. Water Assets Ltd, with its details kept strictly confidential.
However, it was only in July 2021 that Azerbaijan opened a trade office in Tel Aviv, which the Israeli ambassador in Baku described as a historic event. Despite nearly 30 years of direct contacts, Azerbaijan only opened its embassy in Israel in March 2023. It turns out that it was after the 2020 war against Artsakh — and especially after achieving victory with the help of Israeli supplies — that this cooperation was made public. Israeli officials also emphasized the need to use the “liberated territories” against Iran in the future.
It is also believed that the open declaration on warm relations was encouraged by the tough stance of the West and Iran regarding the aggression unleashed against Artsakh and Armenia. However, Azerbaijan began to lose its status as the only Muslim country with good relations with Israel after the signing of the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel in 2020–2021 under U.S. mediation, as well as due to increased Iranian pressure on Baku over Israel’s presence.
In summary, the Azerbaijan–Israel alliance is built on two main pillars — economic (oil and gas) and military (weapons, intelligence). The Jewish state is an important buyer of Azerbaijani energy resources, and Azerbaijan plays an important role in Israel’s energy security. Moreover, in 2019 an agreement was signed in Tel Aviv to build the EastMed gas pipeline, which envisions the supply of Azerbaijani gas to the Mediterranean and then to Israel. In other words, projects discussed since the late 2000s are gradually being implemented, and as a result of the Syrian events, Azerbaijan is also considering the possibility of supplying gas to Syria and further south through its territory.
Economic ties between the two countries are not limited to oil trade. They also cooperate in agriculture, technology, and healthcare. The latter sector is known in particular for corruption schemes and reports of organ trafficking. Despite Baku’s seemingly neutral statements, there is evidence from the Israeli prime minister and other officials that Azerbaijan supported the Jewish state in the war against Gaza, at least by increasing fuel supplies.
Although the earliest available information about arms deals dates to 2008, there are also reports of Israeli military assistance to Azerbaijan during the First Karabakh War (for example, the supply of Stinger missiles). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2016 and 2020, 69% of Azerbaijan’s imported arms came from Israel, accounting for 17% of Israel’s total arms exports.
For Israel, arms sales to Azerbaijan not only provide economic benefits but also give the Jewish state a significant platform against Iran. Despite Baku’s denials, Iran has claimed that Azerbaijani territory is used for at least intelligence purposes against it. In addition to Iran, Azerbaijan can serve as an important gateway for Israel toward Russia and Central Asia, which explains Israel’s determination to establish a stable presence in Azerbaijan and to make it a significant regional player. Despite Israeli–Azerbaijani relations can be described as multi-layered strategic partnership, they are still underfomalized. As Ilham Aliyev said, “they are like an iceberg, nine-tenths of which is invisible to outsiders.”
In fact, while the Azerbaijan–Israel alliance has positive significance for both countries, it is problematic for other regional states due to security challenges. Within the framework of this alliance, the civilian populations of Azerbaijan and Israel are used as “military fodder,” while the results benefit exclusively the ruling families and their relatives.