2026
2026-10-22
During Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s official visit to Berlin, Germany and Azerbaijan signed a Joint Declaration on the Strategic Agenda for Bilateral Partnership on July 21, 2026. According to Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the declaration’s key areas of focus extend beyond energy supplies and transit infrastructure to include political dialogue, trade and investment, security and defence (including cooperation in the defence industry), culture and education, science, and technology. The declaration is a political document, and its implementation depends on the availability of resources. Azerbaijan is expected to supply Germany with approximately 2 billion cubic meters of gas annually in 2027. In Berlin, Aliyev referred to an initial volume of 1.5 billion cubic meters under a ten-year contract.
There is no direct pipeline connection. Azerbaijani gas enters Europe via Italy, while Germany receives it through swap agreements. According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy, in 2025 Azerbaijan exported 12.8 billion cubic metres of gas to European countries. The Azerbaijani president has stated that these volumes could increase. For comparison, according to the European Commission, EU member states collectively imported 289 billion cubic metres of gas in 2025. This means that Azerbaijan accounted for approximately 4% of the European Union’s total gas imports.
As a result of the Russia–Ukraine war and the ongoing US–Iran conflict, two major trade routes connecting Asia and Europe have been disrupted: the Northern Corridor, which runs through Russia, and the southern routes passing through the Persian Gulf and Iran. Under these circumstances, the role of the Middle Corridor, which connects China and Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, is growing. According to available data, approximately 5 million tonnes of cargo transited through the corridor in 2025. Azerbaijan’s importance to Europe is also increasing due to its geographical location and energy resources.
Germany, Europe’s largest economy and once the continent’s biggest buyer of Russian gas, has been compelled by ongoing conflicts to diversify its energy import sources. In this context, Germany and Austria began receiving gas from Azerbaijan in January 2026. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, seeks to strengthen its position as a regional hub connecting China, Central Asia, and Europe. Through the Middle Corridor and the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan is seeking to establish itself as a major transit hub, leveraging its geographical location as an instrument of foreign policy and economic influence. The strategy aims to enhance the country’s international standing and strengthen its ties with Europe and Asia.
In this context, Azerbaijan faces two key challenges. First, its existing pipelines and railway connections to Turkey and the Black Sea basin pass through Georgia, leaving Baku to some extent dependent on Tbilisi. To reduce Georgia’s leverage, Azerbaijan attaches vital importance to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project, which would not only diversify transit routes but also strengthen Baku’s control over its exclave of Nakhijevan. Nakhijevan’s autonomy was substantially curtailed by the constitutional amendments approved on March 10, 2026, although the autonomous republic’s status has formally been retained.
The second challenge is limited access to investment and technology. In Berlin, Aliyev stated that increasing gas supplies requires both demand from buyers and infrastructure expansion. He also called on European banks, particularly the European Investment Bank, to reconsider their decision to suspend financing for oil and gas projects. Furthermore, existing infrastructure capacity is insufficient for Azerbaijan to become a relatively major supplier to Europe. According to Aliyev, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) are operating at full capacity.
Aliyev’s visit to Berlin was of considerable propaganda value to Azerbaijan’s leadership, which presents it to domestic audiences as evidence of the country’s growing international standing and diplomatic success. Pro-government Azerbaijani media have described the visit as a “Berlin victory” and “another success for Azerbaijani diplomacy.” For Germany, the priorities are diversifying energy supply sources and routes and developing transport corridors linking Europe and Asia. In this context, some assessments suggest that the signed declaration could help distribute and mitigate existing risks amid the current crisis.
To expand its gas export routes in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan may seek to build a new pipeline, although this would further increase its dependence on Turkey. The European Union could use cooperation in gas supply and transit to limit Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. For the EU, this also presents an opportunity to develop transport links with Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, that bypass Russia. However, there is no clear evidence that Azerbaijan shares this strategic objective. On July 13, 2026, Aliyev stated that relations with Russia had been “fully normalized.” Therefore, it is more likely that Baku will view this cooperation as a means of strengthening its political influence in the region and enhancing its bargaining position in negotiations with various partners.