THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF AZERBAIJAN: ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND POLICY IMPLICATION

Abstract

In June 2010 the Military Doctrine was adopted in Azerbaijan, and new policies were put into implementation based on the vision of the document. The MD has become the proper installation of Azerbaijani aspirations to restore territorial integrity by any means including military operations. The document provided an impetus to spend billions of dollars on purchasing weaponry, developing army structure, constructing new military bases and enlarging arms production. Policies derived from the Doctrine not only pushed the rapid military growth of Azerbaijan but led to the high level of public securitization as well. Therefore, this research has an aim to assess the causation between the document adoption and defense policies, which were implemented to guide the military build-up of Azerbaijan and achieve social unity legitimizing the possibility of war.

Keywords: military doctrine, Azerbaijan, military build-up, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Introduction

The four-day war in April 2016 cost the lives of 106 Armenians. It has become the most intense eruption of violence since the ceasefire was signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in May 1994. Although the April war is considered as a peak of escalations since 1994, it is not an exceptional case of ceasefire violation. Front-line aggression and violations of ceasefire have become more intense and frequent especially in the past nine years. But the question why the character and frequency of ceasefire violations have been changed recently remains open. There are indications to claim that Azerbaijan proves to be more confident to provoke violence as intentions to develop the army have given tangible results. Azerbaijan has tried to enhance its military capabilities since its independence. But the adoption of Military Doctrine in 2010 has marked a new phase in the military build-up of the country. Policies derived from
the document gave a new impetus for enhancing military capabilities and pursuing the military agenda of Azerbaijan during the past nine years. Policy implementation stemming from the Doctrine created a new reality in Azerbaijan regarding military potential, which allowed to put on the table of discussions the military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, there is no study in the literature that analyzes the link between policies derived from the Military Doctrine and its implications. It is essential to reveal the causation between the document adoption and defense policies, which were implemented to guide the military build-up of the country. This policy implementation led not only to the high level of militarization and army modernization but also created a fertile ground for securitization of the Azerbaijani public domain. Therefore, the research has an aim to assess the policy implementation stemming from the Doctrine and understand how it has contributed to the military growth of Azerbaijan. To answer this question, the study is divided into several interlinked sections. The literature review is devoted to the discussion and elaboration of the concept “security” and definition of Military Doctrine as such. Constructivism theory and the phenomenon of securitization are also analyzed as a theoretical framework for further analysis. The second section discusses the Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan: what are the fundamental goals and desirable ends for the Republic, what issues are prioritized in the document and how those can be solved. The third section is the assessment of policy results regarding military growth registered since 2010. In this framework, investments in the military build-up, enlarged military partnership, improvement of army structure and the growing defense industry are the variables to be discussed. And last but not least, the final section is directed to the data discussion and interpretation in order to strengthen the analysis done in the previous sections.

**Defining Security**

Up to the end of the 20th century, the research tended to focus mainly on state-centric view to define the concept of security. Although Barry Buzan addressed individual security as an important level of theoretical analysis, it was considered as “subordinate to the higher-level political structures of state and international system”. Despite the fact that academic studies have not dealt with a state as a mean to provide individual security, but vice versa, state is a most prominent structure in projecting

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security for human beings. Consequently, if a state is the main nexus to ensure individual security, elaboration, and development of the concept of national security remains a task of vital importance.

Since the 1970s, however, emerging economic interdependence and multi-dimensional character of international affairs caused a division within academia. On the one side, traditionalists (narrowers) continued to insist that security is a derivative of power connecting it with the containment of war and ability of military statecraft. Wideners, on the other side, came to claim that security is multi-dimensional phenomenon including not only military warfare but other layers as well (political, economic, military, societal and environmental). Although the Widener approach installs security as a multi-dimensional and multi-vector concept appropriate to the complexity of the modern era of interdependence, it does not answer the question why the military affairs are still at the core of states’ national security paradigms.

Constructivism as a framework for analysis: The process of securitization

Up to the 1980s, the security paradigm was studied from two main angles: realism and idealism. If realism considered security as a tool of survival directly connected with a state’s capabilities to project its power, idealists were quite romantic describing “security as a consequence of peace”. Despite the fact, that the concept of security was profoundly investigated from the perspectives of above-mentioned standpoints, all of them did not pay attention to the cultural component in conducting and projecting security. As a result, at the crossroad of different approaches constructivism came to the stage describing security as a “socially constructed” phenomenon based on shared values.

The social constructivist framework created a baseline for formation and articulation of the term securitization in the 1980s by the Copenhagen School of thought. If politicization of an issue means the inclusion of particular issue in policy discourse of governing elites, securitization is

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2 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, SECURITY: A new framework for analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Buzan, People, States and Fear.

3 Buzan, People, States and Fear.


the extreme level of politicization which circulates a problem as a “security threat”. In Buzan’s explanation “security is a self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because of a real existential threat but because the issue is presented as such a threat”. In this framework the key questions are – how the ruling elites (securitizing actor) design a problem and how they deliver it to the public (audience), what techniques they use to pursue people that the problem is a direct threat to their safety and why society’s support is vital to eliminate a particular threat. This process is called “speech act” serving as a tool to mobilize and unify people for handling a specific issue.

Although the literature covers the process and outcome of securitization in different cases, there is little evidence how securitization works in the post-Soviet countries, which are dissatisfied with the status quo and seeking public mobilization in order to challenge the existing order. Therefore, the research would be based on the constructivist approach in order to investigate how the concept of securitization works in the South Caucasus region, particularly in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

What is military doctrine? Managing uncertainty.

If security is a desirable end for any country, military doctrine (MD) is a toolbox to achieve it. It is considered as one of the most important national security documents containing the elements of planning, prediction of war and preparation of army for combat operations. It is directed to the management of uncertainty based on military research and analysis in order to define mechanisms to achieve national security objectives. Posen identifies three main types of doctrine – offensive, defensive and deterrent. He opposes the Clausewitz’s notion that “defense is the stronger form of war”, stating that “offensive posture of document allows to conduct a certain plan and strategy and is more efficient in terms of reducing uncertainties”. Defensive doctrines, on the other hand, concentrate more

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12. Ibid., 164.
on defense policies improving the military environment and capabilities of armed forces during peacetime.13

MD’s definitions given by different countries are quite similar, although some marginal variations exist. The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’ definition of doctrine is entirely inclusive; “doctrine includes fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”14

In order to understand Russia’s approach in guiding the elaboration of the MD, it is important to find out the role and contribution of the Soviet legacy in this regard. Although contemporary Russia’s definition does not emphasize the importance of military preparations exclusively as the MD of USSR did15, the directedness of Russian and Soviet MDs remains the same.16 As during the Cold War, the USSR aimed to counter the West, contemporary Russia does not go far prioritizing “the challenges that the policies of Western states create for Russian security”.17

Described as a “soul of warfare”18 the doctrine itself is theoretical and this creates some difficulties. Logical flaws in doctrine are inescapable as it is elaborated in a peaceful time identifying the ways how an army should operate in case of war.19 Therefore, doctrine should be revised periodically in a way to remain “practical and teachable” and harmonized with the external changes of conflict environment.20

**The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Azerbaijan**

**Brief overview: the process of adoption**

The formation and adoption of the MD of Azerbaijan took quite an extended period. Since Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003, the initiative to develop the MD was put into the process. This period coincided with the intensified cooperation with NATO in the framework of IPAP (Indi-

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19 Latawski, “The Inherent Tensions”; Sloan, “Military doctrine, command philosophy”.
vidual Partnership Action Plan). Though consultations and strengthened cooperation ended up with the adoption of National Security Concept in 2007, the process of adoption of the MD had become more complicated. Although the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan party had an overwhelming majority in Milli Mejlis (Parliament) of Azerbaijan, ratification of MD was delayed periodically. It took another three years to finalize the document, and it was ratified by the National Assembly only in June 2010, with the 110 votes in favor, with 2 against and one abstention out of 125 members of Milli Mejlis.

The MD of Azerbaijan consists of general provisions, 7 main sections and 75 clauses.21 Doctrine is defensive in its character stating that national security objectives are based on defensive policy implementation and protection of national interests of the RA.22 MD defines military-strategic, military-operational, military-technical dimensions of national security handles tactics and techniques in order to achieve primary objectives defined by National Security Concept.23 The MD establishes the scope of the country’s foreign and military cooperation as well. The document is designed in a way to escape foreign dependency phrasing it “as a direct threat to the sovereignty of the RA (3.21).24 Thus, Azerbaijan did not make its strategic choice as other countries in the South Caucasus did.25 Although Euro-Atlantic integration was stated as a vision, becoming a member of NATO’s military bloc is not a goal of Azerbaijan.

Tackling external threats

The doctrine defines possible internal and external threats and determines means how to eliminate them. Although the domestic issues such as prevention of financial and economic crisis, security of energy resources, containment of separatist movements, etc. play a significant role in elaboration and implementation of MD, the scope of capstone put forward the examination of external directedness of the MD and policy implementation derived from it. If to analyze the main external threats reflected in the MD, the three main categories will be formed:

24 Ibid.

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Iranian factor: Iran’s aspirations to develop nuclear power, frequent violations of naval and air borders by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the separatist Shiite threat coming from the southern neighbor.

Russian factor: Changing regional landscape after 2008 Georgian crisis and increased Russian presence in the South Caucasus.

Nagorno-Karabakh factor: the threat to the RA’s territorial integrity and sovereignty- “occupation of territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan by armed forces of the Republic of Armenia” (3.21).26

Countering Iran

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan were quite complicated since the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991. First of all, the confrontation has cultural and religious character. Iranian religious community not once condemned Azerbaijani secular regime for spreading Western values across the region.27 Therefore, Iran, by all means, supports radical Shiite movements in neighboring Azerbaijan trying to change the secular character of the state regime. Azerbaijan has always perceived Iran as a potential threat to its sovereignty especially when Iranian gunboat attacked two Azerbaijani survey ships in Caspian basin in 2001 and when Iranian jets several times violated the air borders at the beginning of the 21st century. Intensified cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel constitute a significant source of concern. On the one side, the alignment of regional adversary Israel and Azerbaijan is not beneficial for Iran, on the other side, militarily strong Azerbaijan may become a serious opponent dividing energy resources in the Caspian basin.28

Russia: breaking the military balance in the region

The scope of possible threats was widened after 2008 August war in Georgia, implications of which were taken into account drafting the MD.29 Even though Russia’s “political expansionism” and radical movements in the North Caucasus were taken into account, those do not play a central role in the defense policy of Azerbaijan. In contrary, Russia’s active military presence in the South Caucasus, strengthened military deals with the Republic of Armenia and 25-year renewal of Russia-Armenia agreement

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28 Ibid.
concerning Russian military base (2010) are considered as a direct threat to the sovereignty of the country. And although the 5.42 article of the MD stated that “possible act of aggression against the state of Azerbaijan is very low”, 3.21 article adds “violation of military balance in the region including the creation of foreign military bases in the region is considered as a direct threat to the sovereignty and independence of the RA”.30

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the agenda

The central role as an external threat was given to the “occupation of Azerbaijani territories and ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijani people by the Republic of Armenia” (2.14).31 The rapid military build-up of neighboring Armenia, strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia are security issues of high importance. The MD provides a legal base to preserve and restore Azerbaijani territorial integrity “by any means” (3.28).32 This, undoubtedly, does not exclude the possibility of military solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Provision itself contradicts to the Constitution of the RA, which stated: “the Azerbaijan Republic rejects war as a mean of infringement on the independence of other states and way of settlement of international conflicts,” and military confrontations are possible only when Azerbaijan “is a victim of aggression” (clause 9.2).33 Here the wording and design of the problem are essential. Azerbaijan interprets the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict not as an interstate conflict between two neighboring republics. As Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto state not recognized internationally, Azerbaijan forms restoration of territorial integrity and return of “occupied territories” as an internal conflict to be resolved.34 This type of interpretation legitimizes the use of force and military actions to resolve the issue.

The Military build-up of Azerbaijan

Military build-up in numbers

The development of military domain has been at the core of Azerbaijani political agenda since its independence. The entire process of military build-up can be divided into three main periods. The first attempts to increase the military power have started in 1994 and continued up to

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
2004-2005. During this time interval, Azerbaijan spent almost 3 bln. US dollars on purchasing military equipment and weaponry. However, Azerbaijan launched the intensified military build-up policy since 2005 spending at an average 1 bln. dollar per year. Interestingly enough, this period coincided with the increased oil revenues in Azerbaijan (see the graph below) started at the beginning of the 21st century.

![Graph showing Azerbaijan's oil revenue from 2005 to 2016](image1.png)

Figure 1 Source. TheGlobalEconomy.com

However, even if the oil revenue level is used as an independent variable to explain the military growth in Azerbaijan, it does not explain the sharp change in military development indicators since 2010. Although statistics specify that since the 2000s the oil revenues in Azerbaijan play a significant role, the amount of it is relatively decreased since 2010.

![Graph showing Azerbaijan's military expenditure from 2006 to 2016](image2.png)

Figure 2 Source. TradingEconomics.com

Sergey Minasyan, Levon Hovsepyan and Artsrun Hovhannisyan, Taratsashrjani razmakan teghekagirq, (in Armenian), [Region’s military handbook], (Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House of the NAS RA, 2016).
If to compare two graphs above, it becomes clear, that the oil income cannot be the sole variable explaining constant military build-up in Azerbaijan. As the figure shows the third wave of military growth started since 2010 when the MD of Azerbaijan was adopted, and the policy implementation stemming from it has put into execution. Since 2010 Azerbaijan registered “the second largest increase” in the world regarding the defense budget.36 According to Global Security’s analysis, Azerbaijan purchased 249% more equipment during 2010-2014 in comparison with the period of 2005-2009.37 Azerbaijan has become the second largest arms importer in Europe receiving 13% of weapon deliveries in 2010-2014 and trailing only UK (14%).38 Furthermore, Azerbaijan is the 4th biggest UAV importing country in the world since 2010. Drone imports comprise 7.8% of global market trailing only the UK (33.9%), India (13.2%) and Italy (9.8%).39 According to BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversation), Azerbaijan was in the 11th place among the most militarized countries of the world in 2016.40 If to assess the situation in CIS countries Azerbaijan is on the 3rd place among the most militarized countries after Armenia and Russia.

Table 1: The rate of militarization in CIS countries 2016 (source: BICC, 2016)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIS countries*</th>
<th>GMI score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>832.69</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>805.61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>774.92</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>761.31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>738.23</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>619.45</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>612.32</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>569.7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>565.24</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>476.26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*No data available on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
Overall, the policy implementation in accordance with the MD provisions and, especially, with the 7th section of the document (Development of military power) brought Azerbaijan to the 58th place among 133 countries with the power index rating of 0.8875 (0.0000 being perfect) according to the US-based survey Center the Global Firepower. The military capabilities and the size of armed structures allowed the Global Firepower to call Azerbaijan the strongest military power in the South Caucasus (according to Global Firepower Georgia is in the 82nd place, and Armenia was ranked to the 93rd).

**Developing the army structure**

According to the Global firepower, the active military personnel comprised of 67,000 manpower and the reserve personnel reached 307,000. Besides army troops, Azerbaijan has the separate subdivision of internal troops, state border service also known as Border Guard of Azerbaijan and the armed forces of National guard incorporated into the Special State Protection service. These subdivisions, of course, strengthen the power and size of Azerbaijani military forces and serve as a mechanism to bypass the inspections regulated by CFE (Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) treaty put into the force since 1992. For instance, the Border Guard of Azerbaijan has capabilities to intervene and defend Azerbaijani borders under the command of President, if it is necessary to support army divisions. This means that Border Guard may become a direct participant in combat operations. Particular attention is given to the development of those border divisions, which are located near Azerbaijan-Armenia or Azerbaijan-Karabakh borders such as division of Horadiz or Yevlakh.

Army of Azerbaijan consisted of ground forces, naval and air forces. Azerbaijan consistently strengthens its fighter aircraft, the main function of which to provide air defense and support to the ground forces in case of combat operations. Azerbaijan immensely purchases Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) including IAI Heron UAVs sold by Israel, which is considered as one of the best-selling UAVs since 2013. Azerbaijan actively improves military capabilities and structural units of air forces, and in this context, it is important to mention the development of air bases located nearby Azerbaijan-Karabakh or Armenia borders. In this list are included

42 Ibid.
airbases of Navtal (10km), Agstafa (10-20km), Aghjabedi (30-40km), Baylakan (30km), Mingechaur (45km), Yevlakh (35km) and Qyurdamir (90-110km). Interestingly enough, airbases of Aghjabedi, Mingechaur and Baylakan are constructed in time interval 2014-2017, the base in Yevlakh was also reconstructed during this period. It is clear, Azerbaijan strongly contributes to the development and equipment of airbases, especially those located close to the Armenian or Karabakhi borders. The figure below illustrates the statement made above (newly constructed air-bases are marked in green).

Figure 3 Air-bases of Azerbaijan locate near Armenian or Karabakhi borders (source: Vrtanesyan et al. 2018)

Azerbaijan invests in the development and modernization of naval forces to project security in the Caspian basin as well. However, the emphasis is done on the development of ground forces connected with the territorial issue with neighboring Armenia. The ground forces consisted of 5 main military corps including the military base in Nakhijevan. However, in 2013 the 5th military corps of Nakhijevan was recreated as a separate combined army unit. The airbase of Nakhijevan is one of the biggest in Azerbaijan with 3300meter airstrip and big military arsenal. The logistics and communication system used in Nakhijevan are provided by Turkey, and the permanent presence of Turkish armed subdivision there ensures the Turkish influence on the development of air and ground forces of Nakhijevani com-

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45 Minasyan et al., Regions military handbook.

46 Mkhoian et al., Azerbaijan.
Military corps in Nakhijevan has become one of largest subdivision of the Azerbaijani army having at the same time perfect geographical location to attack the Ararat valley if the fights are restarted.

_Evolving the role of the Ministry of defense industry_

The Ministry of defense industry (MDI) was established based on the decree of President Ilham Aliyev on December 16, 2005. However, until 2013 the development of defense industry was not the primary goal; the purpose of ministry was to modernize the Soviet-era equipment and sign new deals. The production of armament did not surpass 1 mln US dollars per year in 2005-2006, and the rate of exports was pretty low. In 2009 MDI had only 16 industrial sites. In 2012 MDI had already 30 industrial sites, which allowed to register the immense growth in arms production. If to compare the number of armament production in 2007 and 2012, it increased ten-fold constituting 130 mln US dollars.

Since 2013, based on the provisions of the MD and the necessity to equip the Azerbaijani army, the MDI started large-scale production of new generation weaponry. Only in 2013 325.10mln US dollars were reallocated to the MDI to launch large-scale new generation weaponry production.

Produced armaments are used not only for the local consumption but also as an export product to more than 10 countries. Today Azerbaijan offers more than 1100 types of modern weaponry such as “Shimshek-10” machine gun, day/night cameras, “Yalguzag” and “Mubariz” rifled weapons, etc. Although Azerbaijan is the fourth drone importing country all over the world, it has started the production of a new generation “Zerbe” (Strike) drone in October 2016.

Overall the rate of production registered constant growth since the beginning of the decade. The output of defense products has grown by 42 times in comparison with 2007 and in 2017 Azerbaijan has already 58 industrial sites instead of 30 (2012). The export rate is increasing rapidly, too: in comparison with 2016, in 2017 the export volume was 2.3 times bigger including in the scope of cooperation countries such as the

47 Minasyanet al., _Region’s military handbook_; Makienko, “Waiting for a storm”.
48 Ibid.
50 Shahbazov, “Azerbaijan”.
51 Ibid.
52 Makienko, “Waiting for a storm”.
US, Russia, Pakistan, Iraq and Jordan. Only in 2016, Iraq purchased more than 500 anti-tank grenade launchers RPG -7V2 produced in Azerbaijan, and more than 500 mortars with 60mm caliber, which has become the biggest arm-contract of Azerbaijan yet.\textsuperscript{53} MDI has plans to expand the arms production in 2018 as well. 17 new items are designed to be produced including “Tufân” (Storm) armored military vehicle, which will become the first vehicle fully produced domestically.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Building partnership: military cooperation since 2010}

In accordance with its military build-up and modernization, Azerbaijan was also seeking to enlarge the realm of military collaboration after the adoption of the MD. Although military deals of a country were large-scale in their nature before 2010 as well, 2010 has marked the beginning of a new phase of arms purchasing, enhanced military cooperation, and strategic partnership.

On August 16, 2010, the agreement on “Strategic partnership and mutual assistance” was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Although the cornerstone of the treaty was the agreement on reciprocal aid in case of aggression, the formation and articulation of statements were vague enough to put it into implementation. Briefly, the statements included in the treaty do not specify the obligation of both sides to militarily assist each other in case of a war. However, Azerbaijan reached the inclusion of proposition, that the opening of Turkish-Armenian border is directly tied with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and Turkey would not act against the interests of its strategic partner Azerbaijan; a proposition as a result of which Armenia remained with 80% of closed borders. Treaty also includes regulations and provisions on Turkey-Azerbaijan military cooperation, based on which series of military agreements were signed since 2010.

The Republic of Azerbaijan sees Russia as a potential threat taking into account the existence of Russian military base in Armenia and especially analyzing Russian behavior in the 2008 Georgian crisis. However, potential threats coming from Russia do not hinder the cooperation between countries in the military field. Although the cooperation has rooted in the early 1990s, it had especially intensified after 2010, when between 2011-2012, series of contracts were signed in order to deliver substantial armed packages to Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{55} The contracts included the 1bln -dollar

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Shahbazov, “Azerbaijan”.

deal on purchasing T-90C tanks and “Smerch” rocket launchers. Separate 2-3 bln-dollar delivery included S-300 missile systems and attack helicopters as well.\textsuperscript{56} Notably, during the period of 2010-2015 Azerbaijan bought 85\% percent of its arsenal from Russia.\textsuperscript{57}

Israel-Azerbaijan strategic ties were formed since the Azerbaijani independence in 1991. One of the major intentions of this strategic alliance is the united aim to counter Iran.\textsuperscript{58} Azerbaijan is Israel’s second biggest arms purchaser according to SIPRI.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, the scale of deals immensely increased since 2010. In 2012, 1.6 bln-dollar deal was signed to deliver drones (HAROP kamikadze-drones) and missile defense systems to Azerbaijan, which were used by Azerbaijan armed forces during 2016 four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, during 2016 military exhibition Orbiter-3 and Orbiter-4 UAVs were illustrated, which are items of Azerbaijani-Israeli joint production.\textsuperscript{61} Israel not only one of the major suppliers of high-tech hardware and modern armament, but Jewish diaspora in the USA plays an immense role in balancing Armenian lobby there.

The list of military partners of Azerbaijan is not limited to the countries listed above. Azerbaijan intensively enlarges the scope of military cooperation with different countries including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, etc. Ukraine is one of the major suppliers of armament and artillery to Azerbaijan since RA’s independence. The Azerbaijan-Pakistan strategic partnership is unique in its nature. Pakistan was one of the first countries recognizing Azerbaijani independence in 1991 and one of the few states, which did not establish diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan’s main adversary Armenia. The development of bilateral dynamics between Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia is quite promising, too. Saudi Arabia not only a key state where Azerbaijani weaponry products are exported, but it is an important ally, which refused to recognize the independence of the Armenian Republic and consistently condemns “Armenia for its aggressive policy towards Azerbaijan”.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{61} Mkhoyan, et al., Azerbaijan.

The well-balanced foreign policy of Azerbaijan allows to diversify the sources of military supply without putting into dependence its military aspirations on one country. Till now, Azerbaijan achieves large-scale successes in terms of military build-up and technical development and expansion of military industry, which precisely fits the provisions and goals of the MD adopted in 2010.

**Data and Findings**

Analysis of the Martial Law of RA63

On February 14, 2017, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev signed a decree on Martial Law (ML) which put the bill into the force. The law was drafted in accordance with the Constitution of the RA and provisions of the Military Doctrine. Occupation of Azerbaijani territories, threat to the territorial integrity and possibility of war declared to Azerbaijan are mentioned as emergency cases when the ML can be used (MD indicates that possibility of aggression by Armenia is high, 5.42).

The ML provides grounds for a high level of public securitization. First of all, the Article 1.3 of the ML sets the principle of military censorship assuming a strict control over mass media. This directly contradicts to the Article 50 of the Constitution of the RA. The article on freedom of information indicates, that “media censorship, including the press is prohibited” (Constitution of the RA, 2016). The law also supposes TV broadcast and radio restrictions, control of internet or telephone conversations, bans rallies and the right of people to assembly. The ML emphasizes the importance of the restriction and confidentiality of military information – information about situation in the front-line, number of casualties, etc. Moreover, the public will get the information that the government wants to deliver without having the chance of alternative sources. Consequently, the law legalizes the “manipulation of information” and supposes the spread of “right” data in order to create a sense of fear, obedience, and mobilization of society.

Moreover, if before the revision of the law President could appeal to Milli Mejlis to announce martial situation and it should discuss the appeal during 72 hours, now the time limit was reduced to 48 hours (6.2). This eliminates procedural difficulties, eventually, leading to the monopoly of power in the hands of Aliyev clan, suppression of the opposition and securitization of the Azerbaijani public domain.

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Analysis of the Law on the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan

On December 15, 2017, Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan adopted a new law on Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The revision of the law was connected with the goals and objectives of the MD adopted in 2010 (Ch2. Article 3)\(^6\) as the 1991 Law on the Armed Forces did not reflect installed objectives and implementation of those.

The law on armed forces changed the term of “Armed forces and other military units of Azerbaijan” to the “armed forces of Azerbaijan”. Consequently, if before only issues connected with the army were under the law regulations, now the law regulates the functioning of other military units (1.1) as well. Although the law does not specify which military subdivisions (1.3) go under the control of National Army, it is clear that provision refers to – the Internal Troops of Azerbaijan, National Security Services, State Border Guard, External Intelligence Services, Azerbaijani National Guard.

Now all military subdivisions are subordinated to the National Army of Azerbaijan assuming high level of militarization of the country. Moreover, if the regulation of public order was under the legislation of the internal troops, now it is a task of National Army of Azerbaijan. This means that army will have control over civilian life. Since it has also a duty to implement control over the information flow, freedom of expression and access to information will be subordinated to the needs and security interpretations of military elites.

Overall, it is clear, that modification of the legal base in accordance with the provisions of the MD leads to the consolidation of presidential power, securitization of society and preparation of it for war-torn situations. Both laws allow to interpret the information in accordance with the elites’ will by using a security threat as propaganda for gaining social support and obedience.

Analysis of the speeches of Ilham Aliyev

In order to assess policy implications stemming from the MD, it is important to examine how often Aliyev refers to the Doctrine and its provisions during his speeches. Such statements are indications of document’s importance and President’s commitment to follow the spirit and vision of the Doctrine. Random sampling strategy is used for the content analysis of speeches. Since 2010, President Aliyev made 43 speeches on defense-related topics, which are available on the official website of Ilham

Aliyev (President.az). Speeches are classified in chronological order and each fifth speech is used to be analyzed.

First and foremost, it should be stated that the MD of Azerbaijan put on the table the possibility of a military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (3.28).\textsuperscript{65} Interestingly, Ilham Aliyev’s speeches made since 2010 follow this logic. Aliyev frequently emphasizes the importance and urgency of the modernization and development of the armed forces. Statements such as “Azerbaijani army should be ready to liberate Azerbaijani territories from occupants”\textsuperscript{66}, “we should have a say when a ripe moment for resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict comes”\textsuperscript{67}, “we should be able to restore historical justice at any moment”\textsuperscript{68}, “we will raise our flag in Khankendi (Stepanakert) very soon”\textsuperscript{69} are the examples in point. Army modernization is linked not only with the weaponry import, but also with the production of “the most modernized weaponry and artillery”\textsuperscript{70} corresponding to the 35.2 clause of the MD. Aliyev’s statements most often are the vivid illustration of securitization of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Although the MD (35.2) indicates the importance of armed mobilization and their readiness to combat operations, Aliyev goes beyond calling for national mobilization to “fight for homeland and liberate it”.\textsuperscript{71} He uses a “speech act” not only to securitize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also to manipulate the patriotic feelings of the society. In his speeches, Aliyev frequently expresses gratefulness to the Azerbaijani families, who raise soldiers with the high sense of patriotism, courage and the readiness to serve the national interests of Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{72} April war in 2016 intensified the use of patriotic statements in Pres-


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{70} “Speech of Ilham Aliyev in the Cabinet of Ministers assessing the results of 2010.”


ident’s speeches. In this context, Aliyev makes statements such as “how deep is the sense of patriotism in Azerbaijani soldiers and how they can acquire a victory in any crisis”73 or “the courage of our soldiers returned Leletepe and Aghdara, we will restore the historical justice soon”.74

Overall, in his speeches Aliyev does not cite the MD very often. However, repetitive claims on “liberating territories through any means”, “necessity of military mobilization”, “increasing spiritual readiness and patriotic sense of the army” etc. are reflected in the MD of the RA as separate clauses and provisions. Therefore, even if direct citations to the document are absent in most cases, the link between document’s goals and Aliyev’s statements is clear. This allows to conclude that Ilham Aliyev’s speeches follow the “soul” of the MD of Azerbaijan and have an aim not only to legitimate high ranks of military spending and intensive militarization, but achieve public securitization and social cohesion as well.

**Conclusion**

The research revealed that number one priority for Azerbaijan is the constant military growth, army modernization and its readiness for war. The Military Doctrine served as a guideline for fulfilling these objectives. The MD has become the proper installation of Azerbaijani aspirations to restore territorial integrity by any means including military operations. The document provided an impetus to spend billions of dollars on purchasing weaponry, developing army structure, constructing new military bases and enlarging arms production. The analysis in the third section shows how the military policies of Azerbaijan suit the provisions of the Doctrine as it was able to register a huge military build-up and improve the army structure within several years. Moreover, if to compare the current military indices of Azerbaijan with the indices registered before 2010, it is clear that the Doctrine gave another shape to the military development of the country. Policy implementation derived from the MD contributed to the evolvement of military partnership with different countries. Azerbaijan enhanced military partnership not only with its key allies such as Turkey or Israel but took steps to establish and develop military cooperation with other countries as well including Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Steps were undertaken to develop arms production in accordance with the “soul” of the Doctrine as well.

The findings explain the causation between the policy implementation stemming from the MD and registered military build-up in Azerbaijan.

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73 “Speech of Ilham Aliyev in the Cabinet of Ministers assessing the socio-economic developments of the first half of 2016”.  
Content analysis strengthens this statement proving that the doctrine has become the fundament for immense military growth guiding the defense policies of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the first hypothesis is accepted – the Military Doctrine served as a guiding document for an immense military build-up of Azerbaijan since 2010. Moreover, analysis of legal reforms in military fields, as well as, the analyzed Presidential speeches illustrate, that the Azerbaijani government uses external threats (particularly the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh) to securitize the Azerbaijani nation. This, of course, allows to achieve a high level of social unity and create public support. Not only “speech act” mechanisms are used to trigger patriotic feelings of the nation, but also the legal framework has been modified to provide limitless power for ruling elites and strengthen Army’s role in the country. After the legal amendments, the Army has control over civilian life and has a duty to control information flow, especially the information concerning military situation in the front-line. Thus, the second hypothesis is also considered as proved – the Military Doctrine created a baseline for securitization of society by the Azerbaijani authorities legitimizing possible military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.